First let’s get something out of the way. The Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) is a Frankenstein’s monster that the legislature created and now needs to reign in (not that they listen to me).
As I explained in a three-part series back in the summer of 2017, the TCPA grants defendants in certain cases the unusual right to require the plaintiff to prove its case before taking any discovery. In litigator jargon, it effectively lets the defendant file a “no-evidence” motion for summary judgment without first requiring an adequate time for discovery.
The statute was intended to curtail “SLAPP” lawsuits, e.g. where a big company sues a “little guy” in retaliation for exercising his right to publicly criticize the company. The idea was to stop litigation bullies from using groundless lawsuits to grind ordinary people into submission under the weight of crushing legal fees.
But the legislature in its wisdom used broad language in the TCPA, and the Texas Supreme Court applies the plain meaning of statutes (in theory). So the TCPA has taken on a bizarre life of its own. It can apply to just about any kind of lawsuit, including “departing employee” lawsuits where a company claims its former employees misappropriated trade secrets or other confidential information.
This really makes no sense. There is no compelling public policy reason why some defendants should have a right to file a motion to dismiss before any discovery takes place and others should not, depending on whether the lawsuit falls under the byzantine definitions in the TCPA.
Might this have been avoided by construing the statute “liberally”–rather than literally–as the statute itself tells courts to do?
Maybe. But that ship has sailed. As Justice Pemberton wrote in a recent dissent, Texas courts now apply the TCPA as written, even when the implications “sound crazy.” As he noted, unintended consequences are likely when courts interpret statutes “superficially in a mistaken perception of plain-meaning textualism.” So here we are.
The bottom line is that the TCPA will apply to most trade secrets lawsuits in Texas state court. And maybe in federal court too.
This raises several strategic questions in a Texas trade secrets lawsuit:
1. Can the plaintiff avoid the TCPA by filing the trade secrets lawsuit in federal court under the federal trade secrets statute?
2. Can the plaintiff in a trade secrets suit avoid the TCPA by “pleading around” it?
3. When should the defendant in a trade secrets case file a TCPA motion to dismiss?
4. What evidence does a trade secrets plaintiff need to offer to defeat a TCPA motion to dismiss?
In the words of MC Hammer, let’s “break it down.”
Some trade secrets strategery
First, it’s possible that the plaintiff may be able to avoid the TCPA by filing the trade secrets lawsuit in federal court rather than state court. The federal Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) allows a plaintiff to file a trade secrets lawsuit in federal court as long as the case has some connection to interstate or foreign commerce, which means virtually every case.
Courts are divided about whether the TCPA applies in a federal case, and the Fifth Circuit has not yet resolved the issue. It turns on whether the TCPA is considered “procedural” or “substantive,” which is kind of like asking whether the Beatles were a rock band or a pop band.
Law professors and people who were on law review love this kind of question. Personally, I’m less intrigued. I initially assumed the TCPA was procedural and would not apply in federal court, but there are people smarter than me who argue it is substantive, and I’ll concede you can make a reasonable case for that. (If you want more details on this issue see the good summary in this Law360 article by April Farris and Matthew Zorn.)
If I had to predict, I’d say the Fifth Circuit will hold that the TCPA does not apply in federal court. But for now it remains an open question.
That means that filing your trade secrets lawsuit in federal court won’t necessarily get you out of the TCPA woods. Your choice of state or federal court will likely depend on other considerations, i.e. whether you prefer a judge appointed for life who can do whatever the *#$% he wants, or a judge with no experience who got swept into office because he picked the right political party.
Regardless of where you file your trade secrets suit, you can try to avoid a TCPA motion by pleading around the TCPA. Without getting too much into the weeds, the TCPA applies to claims that relate to “communications” about a matter of public concern. So one theory is that the plaintiff in a departing employee case can avoid the TCPA by pleading only use of the trade secrets rather than disclosure of the trade secrets. Disclosing a trade secret to the new employer is obviously “communicating” the information, so just don’t say anything about disclosure.
That’s what I mean by “pleading around” the TCPA. But this may be easier said than done. Even if the plaintiff does not expressly plead that the employee disclosed the trade secrets to the new employer, that allegation will often be implied.
Plus, the mere allegation that the employee has joined another company and used the plaintiff’s trade secrets may be enough to ensnare the plaintiff in the TCPA’s definitional web. The TCPA covers “a communication between individuals who join together to collectively express, promote, pursue, or defend common interests.” Arguably, any time an employee goes to work for a competitor, there is necessarily going to be communication between employee and employer to “collectively . . . pursue . . . common interests.”
So, omitting allegations of trade secrets disclosure from your pleadings may not be sufficient to avoid the TCPA.
Defense wins championships
Now let’s look at it from the other side. If you represent the defendant in a trade secrets case, should you file a motion to dismiss under the TCPA? I see three potential benefits:
(1) obviously, the potential early dismissal of the lawsuit;
(2) smoking out the plaintiff and making him put his cards on the table (talk about mixed metaphors); and
(3) slowing down the plaintiff’s momentum.
Also, if you win the motion you have the right to recover legal expenses “as justice and equity may require.”
The potential downside of filing a TCPA motion in a trade secrets case is that, if the court finds your motion was “frivolous or solely intended to delay,” you will lose the motion and be ordered to pay the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees for responding to the motion. That’s a momentum shift like throwing a pick-six in the first quarter.
So, deciding whether to file a motion to dismiss a trade secrets case will likely come down to whether you think the plaintiff has enough evidence to prove the claim.
This gets us to the last question: if the defendant files a motion to dismiss, what evidence does the plaintiff need to offer to defeat the motion?
As a threshold matter, the plaintiff can try to prove the TCPA does not apply to the lawsuit. But if the TCPA applies, the plaintiff will need to offer evidence of three essential elements:
(1) the information at issue is a “trade secret”;
(2) the defendant “misappropriated” the trade secret; and
(3) the misappropriation caused some injury to the plaintiff.
I cover the key points of these elements in my Trade Secrets 101 memo (soon to be updated and published in the Texas Journal of Business Law). And a recent opinion from the Tyler Court of Appeals provides a roadmap for offering evidence to support these elements.
But if that salt has lost its flavor . . .
In Morgan v. Clements Fluids South Texas, three employees left Clements, an oil and gas services company, to work for two competitors. Clements claimed it trained the employees on its proprietary system for well completion and production called “salt systems.” It sued the former employees in state court for breach of their NDAs and misappropriation of trade secrets, and the employees filed a motion to dismiss under the TCPA.
The defendant employees met their initial burden to show that the trade secrets claim was factually predicated on conduct that falls within either the “exercise of the right of association” or the “exercise of free speech,” as defined by the TCPA. The court reasoned that the claim was “based on, relates to, or is in response to,” at least in part, the employees’ communications among themselves and within the competitors through which they allegedly “shared or utilized” the alleged trade secrets.
The court then turned to the plaintiff’s burden to establish by “clear and specific” evidence a prima facie case for each element of its trade secrets claim. The TCPA “does not impose an elevated evidentiary standard,” the court said, “and circumstantial evidence and rational inferences may be considered.”
To prove the information at issue was a trade secret, Clements claimed it had a confidential method for salt systems that gave it a competitive advantage. Its vice president signed an affidavit stating that Clements invested millions of dollars for almost 33 years on research, development, training, and testing of its salt systems, that its system was not available through any outside source, that the system was not available outside the company, and that the system had made Clements the industry leader. The Court of Appeals concluded this was sufficient “clear and specific” evidence of a trade secret.
Whether the employees misappropriated the trade secrets was a closer call. The defendants argued that Clements failed to prove misappropriation because it did not show the employees actually used the trade secrets. The employees signed affidavits denying that Clements provided them with any training they did not have before working for Clements, and denying they shared any Clements information with any third party.
But the court found that Clements offered sufficient evidence of misappropriation to avoid dismissal. Specifically, Clements established:
(1) The employees had no experience in salt systems before working for Clements.
(2) Clements trained the employees to perform salt systems and disclosed its proprietary formula to them.
(3) The employees left Clements to go to a company, Greenwall, that was not doing salt systems.
(4) Shortly after that, Greenwell launched a salt systems business, announcing it in a website post authored by one of the employees.
(5) Greenwell then performed a salt systems job for Pioneer, one of Clements’ customers.
“Given Clements’ description of the time, money, and effort dedicated to the development of its salt systems,” the court said, “it is reasonable to conclude from the totality of the circumstantial evidence that [the employees] used Clements’ proprietary and confidential information in concert with Greenwell to launch its salt systems business.”
Finally, Clements had to offer evidence it was injured by the trade secrets misappropriation. “The burden of proof on damages for misappropriation of trade secrets is liberal,” the court said, “and is satisfied by showing the misappropriation, the defendant’s subsequent commercial use, and evidence by which the jury can value the rights the defendant obtained.” The Texas Supreme Court does not require the plaintiff to establish a specific amount of damages in response to a TCPA motion. Clements was only required to offer evidence supporting a “rational inference as the existence of damages, not their amount or constituent parts.”
The defendants argued that Clements failed to link its loss of the Pioneer job to the alleged misappropriation of trade secrets, but the court disagreed. Greenwell did not previously do salt systems jobs, it performed a salt systems job for Pioneer shortly after the Clements employees joined, and Clements had previously performed all of Pioneer’s salt systems jobs. This was sufficient circumstantial evidence to link the alleged misappropriation to Clements’ loss of Pioneer’s business, establishing an injury to Clements.
The Morgan case teaches us that, while speculation and assumption are not evidence of trade secret misappropriation, you don’t need surveillance camera footage of the employee handing over the secret formula either. It’s enough to offer circumstantial evidence creating a reasonable inference that an employee has used the information to help a competitor take business from the plaintiff.
But Morgan was somewhat unusual. The plaintiff had actual evidence of a secret method that other competitors (allegedly) did not know or practice.
Most trade secrets cases don’t have this. The typical case involves “soft” trade secrets like customer lists, prices, and customer information. And usually the two competitors both do the same kind of non-confidential business before and after the employee changes jobs. In these cases, the fact that a customer follows an employee from one company to another doesn’t necessarily prove the employee used any confidential information. It could just mean the employee has a good relationship with the customer.
So plaintiffs in soft trade secrets cases beware. You will probably need “something more” than losing a customer to defeat a TCPA motion. At least until the legislature fixes the monster it created.
*Update: See also McDonald Oilfield Operations, LLC v. 3B Inspection, LLC, No. 01-18-00118-CV, 2018 WL 6377432 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 6, 2018) (reversing trial court’s denial of TCPA motion to dismiss in departing employee case involving competitors in the pipeline monitoring business).
Zach Wolfe (firstname.lastname@example.org) is a Texas trial lawyer who handles non-compete and trade secret litigation at his firm Fleckman & McGlynn, PLLC. Most of his posts don’t have so many footnotes.
These are his opinions, not the opinions of his firm or clients, so don’t cite part of this post against him in an actual case. Every case is different, so don’t rely on this post as legal advice for your case.
 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.011(b) (“This chapter shall be construed liberally to effectuate its purpose and intent fully”).
 Hawxhurst v. Austin’s Boat Tours, 550 S.W.3d 220, 233-35 (Tex. App.—Austin 2018, no pet.).
 Thoroughbred Ventures, LLC v. Disman, No. 4:18-CV-00318, 2018 WL 3472717, at *3 (E.D. Tex. July 19, 2018).
 Even if the TCPA is substantive, it may not apply in federal court because it conflicts with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 and 56. Id. at *3.
 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.001(2).
 See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.009(a)(1). A successful movant also has the right to recover sanctions sufficient to deter the plaintiff from filing similar lawsuits, see § 27.009(a)(2), but it will probably be a rare trade secrets case where the court finds such sanctions are needed in addition to attorneys’ fees.
 See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.009(b) (“If the court finds that a motion to dismiss filed under this chapter is frivolous or solely intended to delay, the court may award court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees to the responding party”).
 Morgan v. Clements Fluids South Texas, Ltd., No. 12-18-00055-CV, 2018 WL 5796994, at *1 (Tex. App.—Tyler Nov. 5, 2018, no pet. h.).
 Id. at *3.
 Id. at *4 (citing In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 586 (Tex. 2015)).
 Id. at *5-6.
 Id. at *7.
 Id. at *8. However, as to a third employee, Laney, the court held that Clements did not meet its burden. Unlike the evidence concerning the first two employees, Clements offered no evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, that Laney disclosed or used the trade secrets at his subsequent employer, ChemCo. And there was no evidence of whether Chemco had performed salt systems before, or that Laney performed any salt systems jobs with ChemCo. Id.
 Id. at *8-9.