They say the early bird gets the worm, but they also say all good things come to those who wait. In Texas non-compete litigation, both things can be true.

Let’s illustrate with a hypothetical. Dawn Davis leaves her sale job at Paula Payne Windows and goes to work for a fierce competitor, Real Cheap Windows. Company president Paula Payne calls her outside counsel and says, “Johnny, you’ve got to do something before Dawn takes her customers with her.”

“Have any of them left yet,” he asks. “No,” Paula says, “but it’s only a matter of time.” (#Hamilton)

“Here’s the problem,” Johnny says. “To get an injunction, I’ve got to show imminent harm, and the mere fact that she joined a competitor may not be enough.”

Paula Payne Windows reluctantly decides to wait. Then, over the next four weeks, half of Dawn’s customers stop ordering from Paula Payne and start buying their windows from Real Cheap.

Desperate to stop the bleeding, Paula Payne assigns a new sales guy, Eric Boonster, to the rest of Dawn’s accounts. But Eric doesn’t have Dawn’s experience, or her personal relationships with the customers. Two more customers jump to Real Cheap.

That’s the last straw. Paula Payne Windows sues Dawn and Real Cheap in Texas state court. Paula Payne asks the judge for a temporary injunction barring Dawn from doing business with any of the customers she serviced while working for Paula Payne.

At the hearing, Paula Payne Windows argues that its new sales guy can service Dawn’s customers, and that the customers will stick with Paula Payne Windows if the court orders Dawn to stop doing business with them. But on cross examination, Paula admits the customers are free to go to any company they want, and that she could quantify the amount of lost profits from any sales the company loses to Real Cheap.

Dawn doesn’t buy it. She gets on the stand and says, “I’ve known most of these customers for years, and there’s no way they will stay with Paula Payne if the court tells them they’re not allowed to keep buying from me.”

So, under Texas law, what is the correct ruling by the trial court judge?

(A) Grant a temporary injunction prohibiting Dawn from doing business with any of her former customers from Paula Payne Windows from that point forward. The loss of sales and customer goodwill establishes irreparable injury.

(B) Grant a temporary injunction prohibiting Dawn from soliciting or doing business with any of her former customers who have not yet left Paula Payne Windows, because there is insufficient evidence the customers who have already left would go back to Paula Payne Windows.

(C) Deny a temporary injunction. There is no evidence the customers at issue will buy from Paula Payne if they can’t buy from Dawn, and any sales Paula Payne loses can be adequately compensated with damages.

Personally, I tend to favor answer C, for reasons I explained in The Problem With Non-Competes. But to be fair, you can make a case for each one of these choices. You can find Texas cases to support any one of them.

In one recent case, the court chose answer B, the intermediate option. There is some logic to that choice, as we will see, but it results in a dilemma for the employer who is trying to enforce the non-compete and hold on to customers.

The Gallagher Case

In Gallagher Benefit Services v. Richardson, No. 6:19-cv-00427, 2020 WL 1435111 (E.D. Tex. March 24, 2020), Richardson admitted she was servicing over 60 former Gallagher insurance clients, despite her two-year non-compete. Gallagher sued Richardson for breach of non-compete and sought a preliminary injunction in federal court.

A preliminary injunction requires proof of a substantial threat of irreparable harm. The judge’s ruling on this element was mixed.

As to clients who were still doing business with Gallagher, the court found that Richardson’s admitted possession of a Gallagher producer report and servicing of former Gallagher clients established a threat of irreparable harm. Id. at *6.

But why would this harm be irreparable if Gallagher could obtain lost profits damages for the loss of client business?

“As to the violation of the noncompete clause,” the court said, “irreparable harm may be shown where future damages would require quantification estimates that can be avoided by an injunction that prevents the damages in the first place.” That harm could be avoided, and the status quo preserved, by enjoining Richardson from recruiting or working for any current Gallagher clients. Id.

If those clients leave Gallagher as a result of Richardon’s competition, the court acknowledged, Gallagher could attempt to quantify its damages. “But that quantification will involve estimates and thus potential undercompensation,” the court said. That irreparable harm can be avoided by an injunction against competition for current Gallagher clients, the court reasoned, noting that courts “routinely” enjoin prohibited competition in these circumstances. Id. (citing federal district court cases).

On the other hand, the court rejected Gallagher’s irreparable harm argument as to clients Richardson was already servicing. The court had specifically asked what evidence supported Gallagher’s argument that Richardson’s current clients would have stayed with Gallagher, id. at *2, and Gallagher argued that the court could “infer” that some of the clients would return to Gallagher if the court enjoined Richardson. Id. at *6. But the court said Gallagher did not prove sufficient facts to support that inference, including its capacity to service those clients.

Therefore, as to clients who had already left Gallagher for Richardson, the court found there was not enough risk to warrant disrupting the status quo with an injunction. Id. at *7.

“Without evidence of how many additional competitors Gallagher faces in the marketplace, or of Gallagher’s ability and realistic prospects of regaining any of the clients now with Richardson,” the court said, “Gallagher has not met its burden of showing more than this minimal extent [of] irreparable injury.” Id. at *8.

The court noted that “other courts have also been hesitant to eliminate a defendant’s book of business where the plaintiff has not offered sufficient evidence that the clients in question would return to the plaintiff.” Id. (citing First W. Capital Mgmt. Co. v. Malmed, No. 16-cv-1961-WJM-MJW, 2016 WL 8358549, at *11-12 (D. Colo. Sep. 30, 2016)).

Based on this reasoning, the court entered a preliminary injunction that prohibited Richardson from doing business with any Gallagher clients she serviced during her last two years at Gallagher, except for accounts she was already servicing as of the date of the injunction. Id. at *7.

The Gallagher Dilemma

Gallagher v. Richardson illustrates a Catch-22 facing an employer who wants to get an injunction to stop a former employee from taking customers with her. If the employer files suit and asks for an injunction before customers have left, it may be difficult to prove imminent harm, because the employee hasn’t violated the non-compete yet. But if the employer waits until after customers have left, the judge may take the Gallagher v. Richardson approach and say it’s too late to get an injunction to stop the employee from doing business with those customers.

So what is the employer with the non-compete to do?

Ideally, the employer would offer testimony that it has the ability to service the customers even without the ex-employee and that the customers are likely to continue doing business with it.

If the employer can get some of the customers to vouch for this, even better, but that’s usually hard to pull off. The last thing you want to do when you’re trying to hold on to customers is drag them into a lawsuit, especially when you’re asking them to testify against the sales person they like. And if the customer already wants to stay with you, why would you need an injunction?

So the employer may have trouble persuading the trial judge the customers will come back, and it may get stuck with the intermediate result of Gallagher v. Richardson. For that reason, some might say the lesson of the Gallagher case is that the employer should immediately file suit when the employee leaves to join a competitor.

That’s a plausible position, but it strikes me as too simplistic. What if you go to the temporary injunction hearing before any customer has left, and the employee testifies that she only plans to go after new customers? How are you going to show imminent harm? This approach strikes me as too hot.

Perhaps the “just right” approach is to monitor the situation closely and file suit as soon as two or three customers jump ship. Then you can point to those defections as evidence of imminent harm, but you can try to get an injunction to stop the employee from taking any other customers.

This still leaves the question of why damages would be inadequate.  But the employer at least has cases it can cite on that issue—as the Gallagher opinion illustrates.

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Zach Wolfe (zwolfe@fleckman.com) is a Texas trial lawyer who handles non-compete and trade secret litigation at his firm Fleckman & McGlynn, PLLC. Follow @zachwolfelaw on Instagram to keep up with his latest shenanigans.

These are his opinions, not the opinions of his firm or clients, so don’t cite part of this post against him in an actual case. Every case is different, so don’t rely on this post as legal advice for your case.

Listen. Do you want to know a secret? It doesn’t really matter whether a contractual stipulation to an injunction is binding on a court.

Still, most non-competes contain some kind of stipulation that a breach will cause the company irreparable injury, and the company is therefore entitled to an injunction in the event of a breach. Let’s call this an “ipso facto” clause.

There are essentially four ways courts can approach an ipso facto clause:

1. Find it enforceable and dispositive.
2. Consider it as a factor favoring an injunction.
3. Cite it as a factor, but without really giving it any weight.
4. Disregard it entirely.

In my personal opinion, no. 4 is the correct approach. I don’t think a judge should give this kind of stipulation any weight. We wouldn’t let private parties stipulate to their own rules of evidence or procedure. And it seems especially inappropriate for a temporary injunction, which is both an “extraordinary” remedy and, traditionally, an “equitable” remedy left to the discretion of the judge.

You might cite “freedom of contract.” Ok, but how much weight would you give a clause that says “in the event of any litigation between Company and Employee, the court shall declare Company the winner”?

No, I don’t think this is the kind of decision we let private parties dictate in advance, and that may explain why you won’t find many Texas cases saying an ipso facto clause is dispositive and binding on the court.

In Wright v. Sport Supply Group, Inc., 137 S.W.3d 289, 293-94 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2004, no pet.), the court said it was unaware of any Texas case holding that an ipso facto clause alone establishes, for injunction purposes, that remedies at law will be inadequate. And in Shoreline Gas, Inc. v. McGaughey, No. 13-07-364-CV, 2008 WL 1747624, *11 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.), the court, citing Wright, said the employer cited no Texas case holding that an ipso facto clause proves there is irreparable injury or no adequate remedy at law.

Addressing an analogous issue, the court in Forum US, Inc. v. Musselwhite, No. 14-17-00708-CV, 2020 WL 4331442 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] July 28, 2020, no pet. h.) (mem. op.), rejected the employer’s argument that the non-compete was reasonable because the agreement recited it was reasonable. “If the rule was otherwise,” the court explained, “every employer could require employees to sign an acknowledgement or reasonableness as a condition of employment and courts would be powerless to hold unreasonable covenants not to compete unenforceable as a violation of Texas public policy.” Id. at *10.

But Texas courts have sometimes cited ipso facto clauses as a factor to consider. In Wright, the court held that an ipso facto clause provided some “substantive and probative evidence” to support the trial court’s temporary injunction, citing the strong public policy of Texas favoring freedom of contract. Wright, 137 S.W.3d at 294.

This kind of “punting” seems to be the most common approach. See South Plains Sno, Inc. v. Eskimo Hut Worldwide, Ltd., No. 07-19-00003-CV, 2019 WL 1591994, at *6 (Tex. App.—Amarillo April 12, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing ipso facto clause, in addition to evidence of irreparable injury, in support of affirming trial court’s temporary injunction); Poole v. U.S. Money Reserve, Inc., No. 09-08-137CV, 2008 WL 4735602, at *8 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Oct. 30, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing ipso facto clause as “but one consideration in our analysis”).

Citing the ipso facto clause as a non-dispositive factor is kind of an easy way out, so I get why courts would do it. But I wonder. In these cases where courts cited an ipso facto clause as a factor, did the clause actually make a difference? In other words, would the case have come out the same way if the agreement had no such clause?

I suspect the answer is yes, but of course there is no way to be sure.

I do know of at least one Texas case that seemed to find an ipso facto clause conclusive. In Henderson v. KRTS, Inc., 822 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ), the buyer of a radio station obtained a temporary injunction prohibiting the seller from interfering with the buyer’s efforts to move the station. Id. at 771-73. On appeal, the seller argued the temporary injunction was improper because damages would be an adequate remedy. The Court of Appeals disagreed, citing the ipso facto clause. The court held that the seller, “by agreement, stipulated that [the buyer] could seek injunctive relief without the necessity of proof of actual damages.” Id. at 776. But the opinion simply decreed this without any analysis.

In a more recent case, the First Court of Appeals reached the opposite conclusion, without citing Henderson. In Malone v. PLH Group, Inc., No. 01-19-00016-CV, 2020 WL 1680058 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 7, 2020, no pet. h.) (mem. op.), the court said an ipso clause had no effect.

The employment agreement in Malone contained restrictive covenants prohibiting the employee from competing against the company, soliciting the company’s employees, and using or disclosing the company’s confidential information. Id. at *1. The agreement also contained an ipso facto clause, stating any breach of the restrictive covenants would cause “irreparable damage” to the company, and the company “will be entitled as a matter of right to equitable relief, including temporary or permanent injunction, to restrain such breach.” Id.

After a bench trial, the trial court found that the employee breached the confidentiality clause by forwarding a bid log report to his private email account, but the trial court also found the company failed to prove a “continuing violation” of the confidentiality provision, and it therefore denied equitable relief. Id. at *6.

On appeal, the company argued that it was entitled to an injunction under the ipso facto clause based on the breach of the confidentiality requirement. The Court of Appeals disagreed, for two reasons. First, there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that there was no continuing violation. Second, the court said “a contracting party’s acknowledgment that the other contracting party has a right to equitable relief does not bind judicial actors or require a court to grant the equitable relief ultimately requested.” “Trial courts are afforded discretion in granting equitable relief,” the court explained, and the company “cannot remove that discretion by eliciting a contractual term from Malone authorizing injunctive relief.” Id. at *6 (citing Shoreline Gas).

So the same Court of Appeals has reached the opposite conclusion on this issue? What gives?

Here’s a hint. In both cases, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling. In Henderson, the trial court granted an injunction, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. In Malone, the trial court denied an injunction, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Similarly, in Shoreline Gas, the case cited in Malone, the trial court denied a temporary injunction, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

You might deduce (or is it induce?) that the rule in non-compete injunction cases is that the party who wins in the trial court wins.

That would be pretty close to accurate, but the truth is a little more complicated. Here’s what I think the “real” rules are:

1. If the trial court grants a temporary injunction to enforce a non-compete, and there is some evidence to support it, the Court of Appeals will usually affirm the injunction and might cite the ipso facto clause as a factor supporting it (although it wouldn’t be necessary, because there would be some evidence to support it anyway).

2. If the trial court denies a temporary injunction, and had some reasonable basis to do so, the Court of Appeals will usually affirm the denial and either say the ipso facto clause had no effect (as in Malone), or say that it was just one factor to consider (as in Wright).

These two rules will apply in the vast majority of cases. And in both scenarios, the Court of Appeals can punt because it doesn’t really have to decide whether the ipso facto clause is dispositive.

In the rare case where the trial court grants an injunction and there is really zero evidence of irreparable injury, then the Court of Appeals might have to bite the bullet and decide whether the ipso facto clause establishes irreparable injury, despite the lack of any evidence. But that will be rare.

So should employers continue to include ipso facto clauses in their non-competes? Well, as much as I hate to include language that I personally think should have no effect, I do include an ipso facto clause in my form non-compete. See The Plain-Language Non-Compete.

For one thing, there’s no real harm in including it. And some judges might consider the clause as a factor, or even find it dispositive, although that would be a mistake.

There’s one more reason I like to include an ipso facto clause in my form non-compete. If I later have to go to court to try to get an injunction enforcing that non-compete, the employee’s stipulation to an injunction can be useful. Why?

Sorry, you can’t expect me to give away all my secrets.

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Zach Wolfe (zwolfe@fleckman.com) is a Texas trial lawyer who handles non-compete and trade secret litigation at his firm Fleckman & McGlynn, PLLC. Follow @zachwolfelaw on Instagram to keep up with his latest shenanigans.

These are his opinions, not the opinions of his firm or clients, so don’t cite part of this post against him in an actual case. Every case is different, so don’t rely on this post as legal advice for your case.

Offer evidence of “imminent harm” and “irreparable injury,” even if judges don’t always require it

In a non-compete lawsuit, the temporary injunction hearing is often the key event, for two reasons.  First, a reasonable time limit for the non-compete is usually around the same time that the case takes to go to trial. So, if the judge enters a temporary injunction enforcing the non-compete until trial, it can be practically the same as a permanent injunction.

Second, a temporary injunction puts the company in the driver’s seat in settlement negotiations. Most employees will have to make a deal with the company, because otherwise they won’t be able to make a living.

Conversely, if the judge denies a temporary injunction, then the company is probably never going to get any injunction. That means the company is limited to seeking damages. This is significant in a Texas non-compete case, because if the non-compete is overbroad as written, the company can’t get damages either.[1]

So the stakes are high at the temporary injunction hearing. That means the lawyers better be prepared to address the enforceability of the non-compete and the traditional requirements for a temporary injunction, because some judges still care about those things.

1. A temporary injunction should be denied if the employee has not competed in the geographic area he was responsible for at the first company

In Cameron International v. Abbiss, the judge denied a temporary injunction because the employee had not breached the non-compete as limited to a reasonable geographic area.[2]

Abbiss signed a one-year non-compete with his employer, Cameron. He later went to work for a competitor, FMC, as its General Manager for the Middle East. Cameron sued Abbiss in federal court and sought a preliminary injunction.

The court found the non-compete as written was overbroad. A reasonable geographic limit would be Oman and Yemen, the court said, because (1) those were the countries Abbiss was responsible for during his last two years of employment, and (2) the evidence did not support Cameron’s claim that Abbiss received confidential Cameron information regarding the entire Middle East. The court found that much of the information Abbiss received at the meeting at issue was either publicly available or was available to employees who did not have non-competes.

The question, then, was whether to enter a preliminary injunction barring Abiss from competing in Oman and Yemen, the reasonable geographic area. The court said no, because (1) there was no evidence Abbiss had competed or intended to compete in Oman or Yemen, and (2) the confidential information Abbiss obtained regarding bids in other Middle East countries was more than six months old and likely stale.

In short, the court in Abbiss denied a temporary injunction because there was no evidence the employee breached or intended to breach the non-compete within the geographic area the court found was reasonable.

2. Judges are not always strict about the “irreparable injury” requirement

In Fantastic Sams v. Mosley, Mosley opened a competing hair salon in violation of his two-year non-compete, which covered a five-mile radius from a Fantastic Sams franchise in Cypress (the Houston suburb, not the Mediterranean island).[3]  After finding the non-compete was reasonable, the judge found that Mosley’s violation of the non-compete was likely to cause irreparable injury:

Fantastic Sams . . . argued the existence of Mosley’s nearby salon, which offers nearly identical hair care services to Fantastic Sams, prevents Fantastic Sams from licensing a new franchise in the area. The court also notes that the Agreement actually contains a provision that requires Mosley to concede that violations of the Agreement constitute irreparable harm to Fantastic Sams. The court agrees with Fantastic Sams that Mosley’s continued operations of a nearby salon, in violation of the Agreement, hurts other franchisees, poses a risk of loss of goodwill, and inhibits the opening of new Fantastic Sams franchises in the area. All of these injuries cause irreparable harm to Fantastic Sams as a whole, and that harm cannot be fully remedied with damages.

“Identical hair care services.” I love that part. I can only assume there was testimony that both salons offered a unique proprietary combination of shampooing, cutting, and blow drying. But I digress.

The passage above from Fantastic Sams is typical of cases granting a temporary injunction to enforce a non-compete. Judges often apply the “irreparable injury” requirement loosely, especially when there is a clear violation of the non-compete.

Yes, there was a contractual stipulation to irreparable harm, but surely that can’t be dispositive. Almost every non-compete has a clause like this, so allowing it to substitute for actual evidence of irreparable injury would effectively abolish the irreparable injury requirement in non-compete cases.

And I don’t read Fantastic Sams as saying that a contractual stipulation, by itself, is sufficient. My practical takeaway from the case, and others like it, is that it’s easier to clear the “irreparable injury” hurdle when the judge sees that the defendant is behaving badly by blatantly breaching a reasonably limited non-compete.

3. Companies should present evidence of imminent harm, not just an argument about “inevitable disclosure”

While courts don’t always apply the “irreparable injury” requirement strictly, DGM Services v. Figueroa shows that the company trying to obtain a temporary injunction still needs to offer evidence that harm has already happened or is about to happen.[4]

In that case, DGM’s president, Petillon, testified that Figueroa received confidential financial information on budgets, revenues, and costs while working for DGM. He expressed concern that Figueroa would use his knowledge to undercut DGM’s prices and gain an unfair advantage. But Petillon did not know if Figueroa had actually provided confidential information to his new employer, GCC, or whether DGM had lost any customers to GCC since Figueroa had left.

The trial court denied a temporary injunction, stating that DGM did not prove imminent harm. On appeal, DGM argued that proof of violation of a non-compete creates a presumption of probable, imminent, and irreparable harm.

The Houston Court of Appeals disagreed. Under recent Texas Supreme Court cases, the applicant for a temporary injunction has the burden to prove these elements to obtain a temporary injunction. Therefore, the Court of Appeals declined to hold that breach of a non-compete creates a presumption of harm that relieves the plaintiff of its burden to offer evidence. DGM only established a “fear of possible injury,” so the trial court was within its discretion to deny the injunction.

DGM also argued that the “inevitable disclosure doctrine” relieved it of the burden of offering evidence of imminent harm, citing state and federal cases applying various versions of it. The Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that Texas courts have not adopted the doctrine, and that it is not a blanket rule applicable to all nondisclosure agreements. DGM was still required to offer evidence of imminent harm.

You can find a lot of articles (like this one) on the inevitable disclosure doctrine, so I won’t go into great detail. Essentially, it is the idea that a court can enjoin a company’s former employee from working for a competitor, even if the employee hasn’t done anything wrong yet, on the theory that the employee will “inevitably” disclose his knowledge of the company’s confidential information to the competitor.

I don’t like the idea of an inevitable disclosure “doctrine.” These are fact-intensive cases that should be decided based on the evidence in each case. Talking about some general “doctrine” distracts from the real issues, which should be imminent harm and irreparable injury.

If the inevitable disclosure doctrine is merely the common-sense notion that a former employee who is working for a competitor is in a position to use the company’s confidential information, then it’s fine. But if the inevitable disclosure doctrine means that the company doesn’t have to offer any evidence of imminent harm, then it is wrong. The DGM case got this point right.

The recent BM Medical case was similar.[5] BM Medical argued that its former employee, Turner, had access to its confidential information such as client lists and prices, and that Turner would be able to use his knowledge to “undersell” BM Medical. But Turner testified that he did not access any confidential information after his termination, that he did not solicit any BM Medical clients, and that the only BM Medical client who became a client of his new company was a friend he knew before going to work for BM Medical.

Like the plaintiff in DGM Services, BM Medical argued that Turner had its confidential information, was working for a direct competitor, and intended to use the information. But like the court in DGM Services, the court in BM Medical disagreed. It held that the trial court was within its discretion to deny a temporary injunction based on the evidence that Turner had not used any confidential information and was not soliciting BM Medical clients.

Lessons from these recent Texas non-compete injunction cases

If you represent the company asking for a temporary injunction to enforce a non-compete, you can cite the contract’s stipulation that irreparable injury is presumed. You can cite the “inevitable disclosure” doctrine. You can cite cases that get confused and say that evidence of imminent harm shows that the injury is “irreparable.”

But ideally, you should come to the hearing prepared to offer actual evidence that the employee has already caused harm to the company or is about to do so, and that the harm cannot be adequately compensated by damages. That way, you don’t have to rely on debatable legal arguments the judge might not find persuasive.

The best way to show imminent harm in a non-compete case is to show that your client has already lost customers to the competitor the former employee is now working for. The best way to prove irreparable injury is to hope the judge doesn’t take the irreparable injury requirement too seriously.

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Zach Wolfe (zwolfe@fleckman.com) is a Texas trial lawyer who handles non-compete and trade secret litigation at his firm Fleckman & McGlynn, PLLC.

These are his opinions, not the opinions of his firm or clients, so don’t cite part of this post against him in an actual case. Every case is different, so don’t rely on this post as legal advice for your case.

[1] See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 15.51(c) (stating that if the non-compete is not reasonably limited in time period, geographic area, and scope, then the court must reform the non-compete but may not award damages occurring prior to reformation).

[2] Cameron Int’l Corp. v. Abbiss, No. H-16-2117, 2016 WL 6216667 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 2016).

[3] Fantastic Sams Franchise Corp. v. Mosley, No. H-16-2318, 2016 WL 7426403 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2016).

[4] DGM Servs., Inc. v. Figueroa, No. 01-16-00186-CV, 2016 WL 7473947 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 29, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).

[5] BM Med. Mgmt. Serv., LLC v. Turner, No. 05-16-00670-CV, 2017 WL 85423 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 10, 2017, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).