The short answer is yes. A non-solicitation agreement is a form of non-compete.
But why does this issue come up? And what difference does it make?
To understand why, let’s back up a bit. It is common for an employment agreement to contain both a “non-solicitation” section and a “non-compete” section. A non-solicitation clause places restrictions on the employee soliciting company customers after leaving the company. A non-compete clause is broader: it places restrictions on the employee working for a competitor after leaving the company.
Every state limits the enforceability of non-competes in some way. In Texas, where I practice, we have a statute declaring that every contract in restraint of trade or commerce is unlawful. But the statute has a large exception for a “covenant not to compete.”
So what about a covenant not to “solicit”? How does that fit into the statutory scheme?
There are really only two options. A contractual covenant not to solicit is either a “restraint of trade or commerce,” which is illegal, or a form of “covenant not to compete,” which is enforceable if it meets the requirements of the non-compete statute.
It’s pretty easy to see why a non-solicitation agreement is a restraint of trade or commerce. Think about it. Imagine if Apple and Samsung signed a contract saying that Apple will not solicit smartphone customers in Asia, and Samsung will not solicit smartphone customers in North America. The Justice Department would be all over that.
It should be no different if the non-solicitation agreement is part of an employment contract.
You can see where this is headed. It shouldn’t help the company to argue that the non-solicitation agreement is not a “non-compete.” If that’s true, it’s an illegal restraint of trade. I’ve made this point before. See When is a Non-Compete Not a Non-Compete in Texas?
But even aside from this dilemma for the employer, there are two reasons why a non-solicitation agreement should be treated as a “non-compete” that is subject to the restrictions in the non-compete statute.
First, common sense. Let’s say I draft a contract that says the employee shall not “cheat” for a period of one year after leaving the employer, with “cheat” defined as “to work for a company that provides similar goods or services as those provided by Employer.”
Hey, it doesn’t use the word “compete,” so it’s not a “covenant not to compete” subject to the statute, is it?
Of course it is. The law isn’t going to let a company get around the requirements of the non-compete statute merely by using some label other than “compete.” The question is whether the function of the clause is to restrict competition. An agreement not to solicit the employer’s customers obviously restricts competition with the employer and therefore should be treated as a “covenant not to compete.”
The second reason that a non-solicitation agreement is a “covenant not to compete” is that the Texas Supreme Court has said so. This is more important than the first reason.
In Marsh USA Inc. v. Cook, 354 S.W.3d 764, 768 (Tex. 2011), the Texas Supreme Court clarified Texas law on enforceability of non-competes. The agreement in Marsh prohibited the employee from soliciting a certain type of business from people who were clients or prospective clients of his employer within two years of his termination.
Under the heading “Enforceability of the Covenant Not to Compete,” the Texas Supreme Court began its analysis by stating:
Covenants that place limits on former employees’ professional mobility or restrict their solicitation of the former employers’ customers and employees are restraints of trade and are governed by the Act [meaning the Texas Covenants Not to Compete Act].
In support, the court cited two state court cases and two federal court cases treating non-solicitation agreements as non-competes.
So that should settle it. A non-solicitation covenant is a kind of “covenant not to compete.”
But what difference does it make?
It matters because a covenant not to compete must meet the two requirements of the statute. First, it must be “ancillary to an otherwise enforceable agreement.” Second, it must be reasonable in time, scope, and geographic area. You can watch a brilliant five-minute video on these requirements here.
The geographic area requirement is often a sticking point. Despite the unambiguous requirement in the statute, it is not unusual to find a non-solicitation clause, or even a broader non-competition clause, that contains no geographic limitation. When that happens, the employee can argue that absence of a geographic limitation renders the clause unenforceable as written.
That’s exactly one of the arguments the employee made in the recent case White v. Impact Floors of Texas, LP, No. 05-18-00384-CV, 2018 WL 6616973, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 18, 2018, no pet. h.).
In Impact Floors, the trial court granted a temporary injunction enforcing the non-solicitation and non-disclosure provisions of an employment agreement. Id. at *1-2. On appeal, the employee argued the trial court was wrong to enter the injunction because the employment agreement contained no geographic limitation. Id. at *3.
That should have been a pretty easy issue for the Court of Appeals, right? As we’ve seen the Texas non-compete statute applies to a non-solicitation agreement, and the statute expressly requires a reasonable geographic limitation.
But the Court of Appeals rejected the employee’s argument on the ground that the injunction only enforced the non-solicitation and non-disclosure provisions of the agreement, not the non-compete provision. Id. at *3.
I’ll leave it to the appellate specialists to argue whether the Court of Appeals got this right on narrow procedural grounds. But as discussed above, the Texas Supreme Court has specifically said the requirements of the non-compete statute apply to a non-solicitation agreement. So, to the extent that Impact Floors says otherwise, it is wrong.
But there is another way to get to the same result. Despite the plain language of the statute requiring reasonable limitations as to “geographical area,” some Texas courts have said that a limitation on the scope of a non-compete—such as limiting it to the employee’s clients—can be used in lieu of a geographic limitation.
So if you’re the lawyer representing the employee, don’t get too excited if the non-solicitation clause has no geographic limitation. It might still be enforceable as written. And even if it’s unenforceable as written, the trial court judge could still grant a temporary injunction enforcing it to a more limited extent.
But don’t let the employer’s lawyer get away with arguing that a non-solicitation clause isn’t a non-compete. That’s just incorrect.
In my opinion.*
Zach Wolfe (firstname.lastname@example.org) is a Texas trial lawyer who handles non-compete and trade secret litigation at his firm Fleckman & McGlynn, PLLC.
*These are his opinions, not the opinions of his firm or clients, so don’t cite part of this post against him in an actual case. Every case is different, so don’t rely on this post as legal advice for your case.
 Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 15.05.
 See, e.g., Rimkus Consulting Group, Inc. v. Cammarata, 255 F.R.D. 417, 438-39 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (stating that a “nonsolicitation covenant is also a restraint on trade and competition and must meet the criteria of section 15.50 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code to be enforceable”).
 The Court of Appeals reasoned that the employee complained on appeal only about the non-compete provision, but that the temporary injunction did not enforce the non-compete provision, so therefore the employee’s complaint presented nothing for appellate review. Id.
 See Gallagher Healthcare Ins. Servs. v. Vogelsang, 312 S.W.3d 640, 654-55 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (“A number of courts have held that a non-compete covenant that is limited to the employee’s clients is a reasonable alternative to a geographical limit”); M-I LLC v. Stelly, 733 F.Supp.2d 759, 799-800 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (taking “holistic” approach and holding that absence of geographic restriction did not render non-compete unenforceable where time period was only six months, employee held upper management position, and employee had access to company’s trade secrets).